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Abstract: A resilient electricity infrastructure is one which preserves continuity of 
service despite perturbations in its environment, if it fails, it does so gracefully, not 
catastrophically. Electricity infrastructures globally are undergoing a low-carbon 
transition with a yet-to-be defined endpoint. What will be the impact of these 
transitions on network resilience? How can we steer them to foster resilience? This 
paper introduces results from a model exploring the evolution of the Dutch electricity 
transmission network under various transition scenarios. The model captures the 
development of this network as a result of the decisions of a set of boundedly rational 
agents, representing power producers and a grid operator. These agents make 
repeated decisions to (dis)invest in various types of infrastructure components, 
driving the evolution of the network. Using network analysis techniques, we evaluate 
the resilience of the resulting network topologies and identify key drivers of 
resilience 
Key words: Electricity infrastructure; Climate change; Vulnerability; 
Simulation, Energy transitions. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Electricity infrastructures are complex globe-spanning socio-technical systems whose 
functionality depends on a relatively stable set of environmental conditions. As forcefully 
demonstrated by events such as the 2012 blackouts in India (620 million people without power) 
and Hurricane Sandy (8.5 million people without power), fluctuations in these conditions – 
whether in the form of droughts, hurricanes or floods – can spark disturbances with potentially 
devastating consequences. Insofar as climate change is anticipated to affect the frequency and 
severity of weather extremes, it poses a potential threat to our electricity infrastructures, from 
degrading their integrity and performance to inciting major blackouts. 
 
Next to the emerging issue of electricity infrastructure vulnerability to climate change, 
unabating societal concerns about the broader consequences of a changing climate are driving a 
gradual shift in the global power sector from a reliance on fossil to renewable energy sources and 
from carbon-intensive to low-carbon technologies. Further fueled by the privatization and 
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vertical de-integration of the electricity supply chain
1,2,3
, and by technological developments in 
the areas of renewable and distributed electricity generation, this transition will have far-reaching 
and systemic impacts on the infrastructure as a whole4
,5,6). How will a low-carbon transition 
affect the vulnerability of our electricity infrastructures to climate change, and how can we 
support the development of a climate-resilient electricity infrastructure? 
 
The vulnerability of electricity infrastructures to climate change is influenced by both the 
geographical configuration and topological structure of these systems. Systems with a large 
proportion of key components situated in heavily exposed areas will likely be more vulnerable to 
weather extremes, and structurally fragile systems will be more prone to amplify local 
disturbances into network-wide blackouts. In this paper, we explore (1) the consequences of 
various trajectories for a low-carbon transition on the geographical and topological features of an 
electricity infrastructure, and (2) the relationship between these features and the vulnerability of 
the infrastructure to certain types of extreme weather events that are anticipated to occur with 
increasing frequency as a result of climate change.   
 
This paper introduces preliminary results from a model assessing the vulnerability of the 
Dutch electricity infrastructure to climate change, taking into account the various possible 
development trajectories of the infrastructure over the coming decades. As a low-lying coastal 
country located at the mouth of three major European rivers, the Netherlands is particularly 
exposed to sea level rise and riverine flooding, as well as to wind storm losses and extreme 
windspeeds7– all of which may significantly affect the performance of infrastructure 
components. Moreover, the Dutch government has committed itself to a 20% reduction in carbon 
emissions by 2020 and an 80% reduction by 2050. Meeting these targets will necessitate a large-
scale shift towards renewable and other low-carbon generation technologies and the realization 
of a transmission/distribution system capable of seamlessly integrating these technologies and 
continuously balancing supply and demand. While it is clear that a transition is necessary, we do 
not know precisely what form the future infrastructure will take. 
 
II. Positioning of the research 
 
A growing body of research suggests that climate change is likely to influence the supply, 
demand, transmission and distribution of electricity in myriad ways. Increases in mean air and 
water temperatures and decreases in river flows are likely to affect the availability and efficiency 
of thermal and hydropower generators
8,9,10
. Growth in the frequency and severity of windstorms 
may increase the occurrence of downed overhead lines, and rising sea levels combined with 
increased frequencies of extreme rain events may lead to periodic flooding of low-lying areas 
and subsequent disruption of power substations. Higher average and extreme temperatures may 
increase demand for air conditioning and refrigeration, possibly leading to long-term increases in 
peak electricity loads
11,12
. 
 
While a significant body of research has elaborated on various weather/climate sensitivities of 
electricity infrastructure components, less is known about the vulnerability of infrastructure 
networks as a whole. To address this gap, our work builds on research in the area of structural 
vulnerability analysis of power networks. Central to this body of research is the notion of power 
systems as complex networks in which failures may propagate nonlinearly through the network, 
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leading to critical thresholds in system performance. Beginning with a graph representation of an 
abstract or real-world power network, studies in this area assess how the successive removal of 
nodes/edges affects network performance
13,14,15,16,17
. This technique provides insight into patterns 
of degradation in system performance resulting from successive component failures. 
 
In addressing the issue of electricity infrastructure vulnerability to climate change, we extend 
on this core approach of structural vulnerability analysis in several ways. First, we modify the 
sequence of node/edge removal so as to reflect component sensitivities to certain types of 
extreme weather conditions, specifically floods and windstorms. In this manner, we seek to 
capture extreme weather-induced patterns of network degradation, producing insight into the 
performance of the network under such conditions. Second, we test not a single network, but 
multiple networks representing different development trajectories of the Dutch electricity 
infrastructure. These networks reflect a range of possible futures, and are intended to capture 
uncertainties concerning the endpoint of a low-carbon transition. 
 
III. Approach 
 
The purpose of the model described here is to assess the vulnerability of the Dutch electricity 
infrastructure to climate change, and to identify options for supporting the development of a 
climate-resilient electricity infrastructure. The model is composed of two submodels – a model 
of infrastructure evolution and a model of infrastructure performance. The infrastructure 
evolution submodel captures the long-term development of the Dutch electricity infrastructure 
under various scenarios, while the infrastructure performance submodel assesses the climate 
vulnerability of these “evolved” infrastructures.  
 
Infrastructure evolution submodel: The starting point for the infrastructure evolution 
submodel is a dataset describing the current configuration of the Dutch electricity infrastructure, 
including generation and transmission/distribution. Four scenarios (plus a baseline) are used to 
describe the development of the generation portfolio over a period of 40 years. These scenarios 
(Table 1) have been selected to reflect a range of possible development trajectories for the Dutch 
generation portfolio. 
 
Scenario Description 
Centralized 
generation 
Continued growth in large, centralized, fossil-based generation facilities.  
Geographical consolidation of generation. 
Distributed 
generation 
Rapid expansion of renewables-based distributed generation, spread evenly 
across distribution grids.  Commensurate growth in centralized generation to 
compensate for renewables intermittency.  
Offshore 
wind 
Rapid expansion of offshore wind in predefined North Sea locations.  
Commensurate growth in centralized fossil-based generation to compensate 
for intermittency. 
Import 
Gradual flattening in the growth of domestic supply, compensated by an 
increase in supply by neighboring countries 
Baseline Infrastructure remains unchanged from its current state. 
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Table 1. Supply scenarios for the infrastructure evolution submodel 
 
The core of the infrastructure evolution model is an algorithm representing the decision 
making procedures of the Dutch transmission system operator (TSO) with respect to investments 
in new transmission capacity. Design criteria for the real-world Dutch transmission grid are laid 
out in the so-called Grid Code
18
, established by the Dutch Electricity Act of 1998. To ensure 
compliance with these criteria, the Dutch TSO carries out annual evaluations of the transmission 
grid19. These analyses serve as a basis for the determination of necessary capacity upgrades.  A 
simplified version of the TSO’s assessment procedure guides capacity upgrades of transmission 
system components in the infrastructure evolution submodel. Each timestep during the course of 
a simulation (one timestep = one year), an algorithm performs a set of contingency analyses 
under peak demand conditions for a set of four scenarios with varying geographical distributions 
of generation dispatch and imports/exports. As a result of these analyses, necessary capacity 
investments are initialized to keep the system in line with the requirements of the Dutch Grid 
Code. 
 
Infrastructure performance submodel: The infrastructure performance submodel assesses the 
performance of the Dutch electricity infrastructure under various types of extreme weather 
conditions that may be expected to occur with increasing frequency as a consequence of climate 
change. This assessment takes the form of a structural vulnerability analysis modified to reflect 
certain effects of these extreme weather conditions.  For each of the topologies generated by the 
infrastructure evolution submodel – one for each scenario representing the final (2050) state of 
the infrastructure – the model executes two analyses. The first analysis involves the successive 
removal of random power lines, with the removal of each line followed by an assessment of 
network performance. The second analysis involves the successive removal of substations, also 
followed in each case by a performance assessment. Network performance is defined as the ratio 
of power delivered to power demanded. In calculating network performance, the model takes 
into account the possibility for cascading failures, which are an important aspect of power 
system vulnerability, and have played a role in some of the most notorious blackouts in recent 
years20
,21.  
 
The model captures the vulnerability of infrastructure components to two types of extreme 
weather conditions – flood events and windstorms. We have chosen to incorporate vulnerabilities 
to these types of extreme weather conditions given both their anticipated role in the context of 
climate change
22,23,24
 and their potential to affect power system performance. Vulnerabilities of 
infrastructure components to both floods and windstorms are represented by adjusting the 
probability of component failure in the structural vulnerability analysis. In the case of flood 
events, the probability of substation failure depends on the elevation of the substation, and in the 
case of windstorms, the probability of line failure is proportional to line length. Failure 
probabilities do not currently account for adaptation measures such as dikes or pylon designs that 
may provide added protection to certain components. 
 
IV. Key Results 
 
Figure 1 illustrates key results from the infrastructure performance model, based on the 
averaged results of 100 simulation runs.  In the tests of both flood and windstorm vulnerability, 
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important differences can be seen in the patterns of performance degradation across the tested 
scenarios. In the windstorm analysis, the networks in most scenarios exhibit convex performance 
degradation – a sharp initial drop in performance followed by decelerating degradation with 
further failures. This pattern can be attributed largely to the centralized nature of production in 
these scenarios – by 2050 most supply is situated in a handful of coastal areas, resulting in a 
situation in which the failure of a few key lines can significantly cripple system performance. 
 
The distributed generation scenario produces a very different result. In this case, the network 
exhibits slightly concave performance degradation, which can be attributed both to the 
decentralized nature of production and to the greater capacity of lines relative to the centralized 
and import scenarios. The decentralized nature of production means fewer “critical" lines whose 
failure engenders a plummet in system performance. Greater line capacities mean fewer failure 
cascades, since remaining lines are able to better handle the extra burdens of successive line 
failures. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Windstorm and flood vulnerability for the different scenarios, based on the results of the 
infrastructure performance model. 
 
The flood performance analysis exhibits similar behavior. In this case, we see a maximum 
performance degradation of 50-60% in the centralized, import and offshore wind scenarios, 
resulting from the successive failure of 114 substations situated less than one meter above sea 
level. The distributed generation scenario performs better, with less than a 40% drop in 
performance under similar conditions. It is important to note that the smoothness of these 
averaged results conceals highly nonlinear behavior that may occur in individual runs. In some 
cases the failure of a single line or substation can cause a drop in network performance of 10-
20% as the network reaches a critical threshold.  These critical thresholds may be reached sooner 
or later, depending on the sequence in which lines or substations fail. 
V. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The results suggest that a future Dutch infrastructure based around distributed generation may 
help to mitigate electricity infrastructure vulnerability to climate change. However, this does not 
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imply that a system based around more centralized generation is inevitably less resilient. The 
results suggest that much degradation in system performance arises from sudden and periodic 
large drops in network performance when the system reaches a critical threshold. Adaptation 
measures such as demand-side management and generation redispatch – which have been 
excluded from this analysis – could be employed in real time to alleviate stress within the 
network as these thresholds are approached. Harder measures such as dikes and pylon 
reinforcements can also help to inhibit the buildup of component failures.  Future research will 
explore the potential benefits of such options and will explore the consequences of key 
assumptions underlying the presented model. 
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